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Chapter 3
Building Blocks of the 
Security and Management 
Engine
Technology is nothing. What’s important is that you have a faith in 
people, that they’re basically good and smart, and if you give them tools, 
they’ll do wonderful things with them.
— Steve Jobs
The kernel of Intel’s security and management engine provides useful tools to application 
developers. Wonderful applications can be created on the engine with these tools.
The engine is designed to execute applications—both natively built on the engine 
and dynamically loaded from the host operating system. It is not a general-purpose 
environment per se; however, it is designed to be a foundation for various kinds of 
applications, especially ones that realize security functionalities.
In order to support and engage with existing and future applications, the kernel 
of the engine must provide a comprehensive set of basic services and tools to fulfill 
requirements of upper-level modules. As the number of applications running on 
the engine keeps growing, the number of kernel functions has grown accordingly to 
accommodate new functional requirements.
This chapter introduces interesting features and interfaces of the engine’s kernel. 
Because security is the main usage of the engine and the main subject of this book,  
I will focus on the cryptography functions first. Besides general functionality, to address 
the specific requirements of embedded mobile systems, I will also review a number of 
design strategies and useful tricks for improving performance, saving power and memory 
consumption, and protecting privacy.
All cryptographic algorithms implemented by the security and management engine 
follow applicable US government and industry standards. There are some proprietary 
Intel security heuristics for the kernel’s hardening measures, but they are not available to 
applications.
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This chapter begins with a quick reference to the cryptography standards and then 
reveals how the engine implements them in its embedded environment. The focus 
is on the input and output interface of the cryptographic algorithms, rather than the 
mathematical details of the algorithms. Readers interested in understanding how  
the algorithms are designed should refer to generic cryptography lectures.  
D. R. Stinson’s Cryptography: Theory and Practice (Chapman and Hall/CRC, 2005)1 is a 
good introductory textbook on cryptography.
Random Number Generation
The random number generator (RNG) is the most invoked cryptography function on the 
engine. Except for hash, all cryptographic algorithms use keys, which are generated by 
a well-designed and well-implemented RNG. The security and management engine’s 
firmware applications use the kernel’s RNG for generating keys and nonces (a nonce is a 
random number that is used only once).
The RNG is a hardware device of the engine, and the kernel firmware wraps the 
hardware RNG and implements interface for applications to invoke. The RNG device 
consists of the following components:
•	 Nondeterministic random bit generator (NDRBG): This provides 
seeding materials to the pseudo random number generator. The 
entropy source consists of variations of temperature, voltage, and 
power. The output of the NDRBG is a derivative of the collected 
white noises. There is real-time health test logic associated to the 
NDRBG to examine the quality of its entropy output.
•	 Deterministic random bit generator (DRBG): This implements 
the DRBG specified in National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) special publication 800-90A,2 with the 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) counter-mode option. After 
the (Edward) Snowden leaks, NIST strongly advised against use of 
the DRBG with Dual Elliptic Curve option,3 but the AES counter-
mode option is still an approved and recommended DRBG.
•	 Built-in selftests (BISTs) compliant with the Federal Information 
Processing Standards (FIPS) 140 standard, required BISTs 
are performed by the RNG, including power-on selftests and 
continuous selftests.
The power-on selftest is a known-answer test. During the •	
boot of the security and management engine, the RNG 
feeds its DRBG logic with a hardcoded seed and checks if 
the resultant random number matches the corresponding 
hardcoded answer.
The runtime selftest runs whenever a new random number, •	
32 bits in size, is generated at runtime. It checks whether 
the current output number is identical to the immediately 
previous random number the RNG generated. If the two are 
equal, then the current output number is discarded and a 
new random number is generated.
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The only kernel interface exposed for the RNG is a function for getting a random 
number with the size specified by the caller. The function does not restrict an upper 
limit of the size, as long as the caller has allocated sufficiently large memory to hold the 
random number. All applications share the same instance and state of the RNG. There are 
no interfaces for an individual application to reseed the DRBG or restart the RNG device. 
Reseeding and re-initialization are managed by the RNG internally according to the NIST 







Figure 3-1. Kernel RNG API
Message Authentication
In cryptography, message authentication, or secure hash, refers to the procedure of 
“compressing” a large amount of data (message M) into a smaller message digest, H. For 
a given hash function, the size of H is a constant regardless of the size of M. The digest H 
generated by a good hash algorithm would look like a random string.
M can be of variable lengths, but H has a fixed size: the number of possible M 
values is much greater than the number of possible H values. Therefore, there may be 
many different M values that correspond to the same H value. Cases where two distinct 
messages (M and M´) correspond to the same digest (H) are called “collision.”
A message authentication scheme must be very “sensitive,” that is, the digest H for 
a given M should look like a random bit string; even if only 1 bit of M has changed (been 
altered, added, or removed), the new digest should look like a completely different 
random bit string, with overwhelming probability. Because of this, the digest H can be 
thought of as fingerprints of a human being M.
Besides the sensitivity, a good message authentication scheme must have the 
following important properties:
•	 One-way: It is easy to calculate H from M, but it is computationally 
difficult to derive a message M from H. Because there may be 
multiple M values that map to the same H, the hash scheme must 
make sure that it is difficult to derive any such M from a given H.
•	 Collision-free: It is computationally difficult to find two messages 
M and M´ that correspond to the same H. Note that the sizes of M 
and M´ do not have to be the same.
These two facts make the secure hash algorithm useful in many cryptography and 
security applications. For example, an e-mail authentication server may calculate and 
store the digest of your password, instead of the password itself, when you set up the 
e-mail account. After initial setup, when you enter your password during login, the 
password is hashed, and the resultant digest is compared against the digest previously 
stored on the server at initial setup.
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The hash’s one-way property makes sure that no one, including the authentication 
server, is computationally capable of retrieving the plaintext password from its digest, 
even though the digest is leaked or known by an attacker. The collision-free property 
guarantees that it is practically impossible to find and use a string other than your 
password to authenticate to the e-mail server.
A hash function takes one input M, and generates one output, the message digest H. 
There is no secret, key, or randomness involved in the hash calculation. Anyone who 
knows M can derive H. Sometimes it is desirable to employ a key in the hash calculation, 
so that only with the key can the correct digest be obtained. This is called keyed-hash 
or HMAC (Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code). An HMAC algorithm takes two 
inputs, M and key K, and generates H. In this case, H changes when M or K changes.
The engine supports standard message authentication schemes:
MD5 (Request for Comments (RFC) 1321•	 4)






HMAC keyed hash with the preceding underlying hash schemes •	
(FIPS 198-16)
Figure 3-2 shows the engine’s kernel interface for hash.












Figure 3-3. Kernel HMAC API
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The output hash is 16 bytes long for MD5, 20 bytes for SHA-1, 28 bytes for SHA-224, 
32 bytes for SHA-256, 48 bytes for SHA-384, and 64 bytes for SHA-512. As MD5 and SHA-1 
have smaller output digests, there are well-known attacks against them that reduce 
security strength. NIST recommends against using MD5 and SHA-1 and recommends 
moving to SHA-256 and above. Intel’s security and management engine continues to 
support MD5 and SHA-1 for legacy and backward compatibility.
For example, a lot of network equipment deployed in the field today still utilizes 
SSL/TLS crypto suites that use MD5 or SHA-1 for message authentication. The Intel 
AMT (Advanced Management Technology) application must continue to accept them. 
However, new firmware applications shall not use MD5 or SHA-1. Note that HMAC-MD5 
and HMAC-SHA-1 are still approved algorithms by NIST and are being used in various 
applications for the security and management engine.
On the engine, among these secure hashing algorithms, the most frequently invoked 
ones—MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, and their HMAC variants—are implemented by hardware 
with firmware wrappers in kernel. The others are implemented by firmware. The 
firmware implementation was ported from the Intel Integrated Performance Primitives 
crypto library.7
Hash with Multiple Calls
The kernel interface for message authentication allows the caller to set up a context and 
pass in the message to be hashed in more than one call. In general, this resume capability 
is required by applications that do not have the entire message data at once.
In an embedded environment where memory is a very valuable resource, even 
if the entire message can be available at once, it may still be preferable to call the 
hash function multiple times, in order to reduce runtime memory consumption. For 
example, to hash 1MB of data, an application can choose to allocate 64KB of memory 
and call the hash function 16 times—or allocate 1KB of memory and call the hash 
function 1024 times. Because a call to kernel API implies performance overhead (see 
Chapter 4 of this book for details), this is a tradeoff between memory consumption and 
runtime performance.
In any case, the engine’s kernel is stateless, and the hash context must be maintained by 
the application between calls. Figure 3-4 depicts the kernel interface for resume hash/HMAC. 
The application should start with a “first chunk” call, followed by any number (including 
zero) of “middle chunk” calls, and finally a “last chunk” call. For HMAC, the context 
returned from the first chunk call contains a “working” derivation of the HMAC key, so 
that the application does not need to input HMAC key again in later middle chunk and 
final chunk calls.
























Figure 3-4. Kernel hash/HMAC resume API
Symmetric-Key Encryption
Symmetric-key encryption refers to schemes where both encryption and decryption 
processes use the same key, in contrast to asymmetric-key encryption where encryption 
and decryption use two different keys. The most popular symmetric-key scheme used in 
computing today is defined in AES published by NIST in 2001.8 The algorithm specified in 
AES is based on the Rijndael cipher, developed by Belgian cryptographers Joan Daemen 
and Vincent Rijmen.
AES
AES defines three key sizes: 128, 192, and 256 bits. The kernel of the security and 
management engine supports all three key sizes of AES.
In general, greater key size provides stronger protection. However, it is worth noting 
that due to recently published related-key attacks,9 256-bit AES can be broken with a 
complexity of 299.5, which makes it weaker than a 128-bit AES in theory (128-bit AES may 
be broken with a complexity of 2126 due to bicliques). Nevertheless, to date, no known 
attack against any key sizes of AES is computationally feasible.
AES is a block cipher and it has a fixed block size of 128 bits. In other words, the 
algorithm first splits the input data (plaintext for encryption or ciphertext for decryption) into 
multiple blocks, each 128 bits, and then performs a cipher operation on every block. Mode of 
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operation describes how to repeatedly apply a single-block operation to encrypt data that is 
larger than a block. Various modes of operation are defined for block ciphers. The kernel of 
the security and management engine supports the following modes of operation:
ECB (electronic codebook)•	
ECB-CTS (ECB ciphertext stealing)•	
CBC (cipher block chaining)•	




For the engine, the most-used key sizes and modes are implemented in hardware, 
including 128-bit and 256-bit keys with ECB, CBC, and CTR modes. The other modes 
are implemented in firmware, with underlying basic AES encryption and decryption 
offloading to the AES hardware.
For block cipher, all the modes except ECB require an initialization vector (IV) of 
the block size as input to the encryption function. The same IV must be input to the 
decryption function.
For the CTR mode, the IV consists of two portions: a nonce and counter. The kernel 
allows the caller to specify sizes of the counter and nonce, as long as the counter is at least 
32 bits and their total length is equal to the block size.
For AES, the plaintext and the ciphertext always have the same size, regardless of key 
size and mode of operation. The CTR and OFB modes have a nice native feature: the size 
of the data does not have to be a multiple of the block size. That means you can encrypt 
2 or 31 bytes of plaintext using CTR or OFB, and the resultant ciphertext is 2 or 31 bytes. 
The other modes, other than ECB-CTS and CBC-CTS, require data size to be a multiple 
of 128 bits. Also note that for CTR and OFB modes, the same algorithm is used for both 
encryption and decryption.
The CTS variant of ECB and CBC applies smart tricks to the last incomplete block 
and the last complete block of data for the underlying mode, so that the data size does not 
have to be a multiple of the block size (but the data must be longer than one block). The 
CTS mode is widely used in network protocols such as Kerberos, which is supported by 
an Intel AMT application running on the engine.
There are certain requirements and best practices about which modes to use when 
designing an application and how to use them. Here are some critical rules that may not 
be very well known by all software engineers:
For better security, avoid using the ECB mode for data that is •	
longer than one block.
For the CTR mode, the same key and IV combination can only •	
be used once and must not be repeatedly used for encrypting 
more than one data block. If the same key and IV combination 
is used to encrypt more than one block of data, then the security 
is broken and plaintext can be easily derived from ciphertexts 
without knowing the key.
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Let the AES key be k and IV be iv. In a typical chosen-plaintext attack scenario, the 
attacker chooses plaintext block p (128 bits) and calls a problematic AES-CTR oracle that 
uses a constant k and iv. The oracle outputs ciphertext c. According to the CTR mode 
definition,
 
c := AES(k, iv) XOR p
 
where AES(k, iv) denotes the ciphertext for AES block encryption with plaintext iv using 
key k, and a XOR b denotes result of bitwise exclusive disjunction operation for two bit 
strings a and b of the same size. Notice that
 
AES(k, iv) = c XOR p
 
The attacker knows both p and c. His goal is to derive the plaintext p´ for another 
block of ciphertext c´ he receives by eavesdropping. Without figuring out k or iv, p´ can be 
easily calculated as follows:
 
p' := AES(k, iv) XOR c' = c XOR p XOR c'
 
For the CBC mode, the IV must be “unpredictable.” •	
Unpredictability means not only that the IV cannot be a constant 
when encrypting multiple pieces of data, but also that an 
adversary must not be able to control or know the IV before the 
encryption happens. In practice, it is recommended to randomly 
generate IV for each piece of data to be encrypted.
Let the AES key be k. Consider a chosen-plaintext attack on a problematic AES-CBC 
oracle that uses predictable IV. The attacker has managed to acquire values of the iv and 
the first ciphertext block c (128 bits), and his goal is to guess the plaintext p. According to 
the CBC mode definition,
 
c := AES(k, iv XOR p).
 
The attack is allowed to submit his chosen plaintext p´ and have the oracle perform 
AES-CBC encryption using the same key k. Because IV is predictable, the attacker knows 
the value of the IV, denoted iv´, which will be used in his encryption request. Let p_guess 
represent the attacker’s “guessed” value of p. He calculates p´ and submits to the oracle:
 
P' := iv XOR iv' XOR p_guess.
 
The oracle performs encryption as follows and outputs c´:
 
c' := AES(k, iv' XOR p')
    = AES(k, iv' XOR (iv XOR iv' XOR p_guess))
    = AES(k, iv XOR p_guess).
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With c and c´ in hand, the attacker just needs a simple comparison. If c = c´, then  
p = p_guess. Otherwise, a new p_guess is chosen and p´ submitted. The attacker repeats 
his guess until c´ matches c. It may look an unscalable brute force effort. However, for many 
applications (for example, a social security number), the number of possible plaintext 
values is small and it is not infeasible to exhaust all possibilities. Using random IV thwarts 
this attack.
Note ■  for the Ctr mode, the same key and iV combination can only be used once.  
for the CBC mode, the iV must be unpredictable.
Before performing encryption or decryption, the AES key is first expanded using 
the Rijndael key schedule to generate “round keys” that are used in encryption and 
decryption. Most software libraries of AES provide a function for initializing and 
expanding the AES key into round keys. For encryption/decryption calls, the round keys 
are passed in, in lieu of the original AES key, to avoid repeating key expansion operations. 
However, this trick is not implemented by the security and management engine. Thanks 
to dedicated hardware, the key expansion is not a bottleneck for performance.
DES/3DES
In addition to AES, for backward compatibility, the kernel of the security and 
management engine also supports DES (data encryption standard),10 an older standard 
for encryption that was replaced by AES.
DES has a fixed block size of 64 bits, and key sizes of 56 (DES), 112 (two-key 3DES), 
and 168 (three-key 3DES) bits, respectively. 56-bit DES is considered insecure because 
the key size is too small, but 3DES is still being used by many devices in the field today. 
The security and management engine supports DES and 3DES in ECB, CBC, and CTR 
modes. They are all implemented by firmware.








IV (if not ECB mode)
mode of operation
updated IV (if not ECB mode)
Figure 3-5. Kernel AES/DES/3DES API
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Asymmetric-Key Encryption: RSA
Today, RSA11 is the most widely deployed asymmetric-key encryption scheme. RSA 
stands for the last names of Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman—the three 
cryptographers who first invented and published the algorithm back in 1977.
For symmetric-key cryptography like AES or DES/3DES, the encrypter and decrypter 
must both know the same key beforehand. If the encrypter and decrypter have no prior 
knowledge of each other but want to communicate securely, how do they agree on the key?
Consider a real-world scenario. When making the first purchase on Amazon using 
your new smartphone, how does the phone transmit your credit card number and order 
information securely to Amazon’s server so eavesdroppers on the open Internet cannot 
see? The solution is offered by asymmetric-key cryptography, where the encryption 
method uses one key, called a public key, and the decryption method uses another key, 
called a private key. A public key and a uniquely corresponding private key form a key 
pair, and they both belong to the decrypter.
The public key is not a secret. It is published and available to anyone who wishes to 
send encrypted messages to the decrypter. The private key is known to only the decrypter 
and it must be kept secret. Only the decrypter who knows the private key is able to 
decrypt a message encrypted with its public key. Hence, asymmetric-key cryptography is 
also known as public key cryptography.
During an online purchase, your smartphone first encrypts your credit card number 
with Amazon’s public key and then transmits the encrypted card number. Since only 
Amazon knows the private key, it is the only entity that can decrypt the message and 
retrieve your card number. Eavesdroppers on the network can’t decrypt the data.
In reality, what is encrypted using Amazon’s public key may not be your credit card 
number, but an AES key randomly generated by your smartphone. After the encrypted 
AES key is transmitted to and decrypted by Amazon, your phone and Amazon can use AES 
to protect the credit card number and other order information. But why bother to use 
AES if public key encryption works? The reasons are speed and power. Symmetric-key 
cipher is always much faster and less resource-consuming than asymmetric-key cipher. 
Therefore, the latter is often only used for encrypting symmetric keys for AES and HMAC, 
and not the bulk data. At a high level, the interactions between the client and the server 






Figure 3-6. Asymmetric key encryption and decryption
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One may question how the client can be confident that the public key indeed 
belongs to the server it intends to connect with, and not a man-in-the-middle. The trust 
is established by the PKI (public key infrastructure) system rooted to a CA (certification 
authority) that is trusted by both the client and the server. The book Active Platform 
Management Demystified—Unleashing the Power of Intel vPro Technology (Intel Press, 
2009)12 elaborates details on PKI and how the AMT application running on the security 
and management engine implements PKI.
The security and management engine implements the following functions for RSA, 
compliant with the PKCS #1 standard issued by the RSA Laboratories:
Key pair generation•	
Key pair validation•	
Raw encryption and decryption•	
Encryption and decryption with PKCS #1 v1.5 padding•	
Encryption and decryption with OAEP padding•	
Key Pair Generation and Validation
The kernel’s key pair generation for k-bit RSA, where k is an even integer, exercises the 
following steps:
 1. The first step of generating an RSA key pair is to generate two 
big prime integers of length k/2 bits each.
To generate a big prime number, first generate a random 
number and then run a primality test against the random 
number. The primality test ensures that the candidate has an 
acceptably high probability of being a prime. For k-bit RSA 
key pair generation, the kernel generates two distinct big 
random numbers. For each of the two numbers, set the most 
significant two bits to 1 and the least significant bit to 1. 
Setting the most significant two bits to 1 ensures that the 
product of the two numbers is exactly k bits and not fewer 
than k bits. Setting the least significant bit ensures the number 
is odd, because an even, big number cannot be prime.
 2. Run a simple primality test on the two numbers (prime 
candidates), respectively.
The simple primality test works as follows. The smallest 
2048 primes are hardcoded in firmware. The security and 
management engine hardcodes only 2048 primes, but if space 
allows, then hardcoding more prime numbers would speed 
up the key generation further, because composite candidates 
can be eliminated sooner.
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Divide the candidate by every one of the 2048 primes, one 
after another, and save the 2048 remainders. If any of the 2048 
remainders is 0, then the candidate is composite. However, 
do not give up on the candidate yet. Instead, add 2 to every 
one of the 2048 remainders respectively, and divide the 2048 
updated remainders by the 2048 corresponding small primes. 
Keep adding 2 to the remainders until a certain numbers of 
additions have been performed, or all 2048 divisions result in 
nonzero remainders. If a certain number of additions of 2 have 
been made and still some of the 2048 remainders are 0, then 
eliminate this candidate and generate a new random number 
as a candidate.
 3. Run a comprehensive primality test against the candidate.
The security and management engine uses the Miller-Rabin 
primality test.13 Notice that depending on the length of the 
prime candidate, the number of rounds of Miller-Rabin tests 
varies. For example, for a 1024-bit candidate, at least three 
rounds of Miller-Rabin tests must be run to ensure that the 
error rate (falsely identifying a composite to be a prime) is14 
less than 2–80. If the candidate is found a composite, then 
generate a new candidate.
 4. After two probable prime numbers p and q are generated, 
calculate their product
 
          n = p * q
 
Note that n has k bits in it. n is called modulus.
 5. Choose a value for the public exponent e. e must be smaller 
than (p-1)*(q-1) and coprime to (p-1)*(q-1); that is, the 
greatest common divisor of e and (p-1)*(q-1) must be 1.
The speed of the encryption operation is determined by e 
and the number of nonzero bits (this is also called Hamming 
weight) in the binary representation of e. Prime 65537 is 
a popular choice for e, as it has only two nonzero bits in 
its binary representation. 3 and 17 used to be popular 
choices but they are considered not strong enough by many 
applications today owing to published cryptanalysis.15
If you choose a prime such as 65537 as e, then divide 
(p-1)*(q-1) by e. If it is exactly divisible, then e and 
(p-1)*(q-1) are not coprime, and a new p or q must be 
generated.
 6. Calculate d, the multiplicative inverse of e, such that
 
          d·e º 1 mod (p-1)*(q-1).
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d is a k-bit integer calculated using the extended Euclidean 
algorithm.
 7. If the application requests, calculate the following private key 
components for the Chinese Remainder Theorem. These key 
components are all k/2-bit long. Using them in the decryption 
operation proves to be more efficiently than using the k-bit d.
 
          d_P := d mod (p-1)
          d_Q := d mod (q-1)
          q_inv := q-1 mod p
 
Among all of the preceding values, the public key consists of n and e. The private 
key consists of n, d, p, q, d_P, d_Q, and q_inv. NIST recommends using at least 2048-bit 
n, which provides equivalent security strength of 112 bits. The security and management 
engine supports RSA key sizes of up to 4096 bits for encryption and decryption. For key 
pair generation, the engine supports up to 2048 bits. Most applications running on the 
engine and in the mobile computing industry today use 2048-bit RSA.
The key pair generation is an expensive and lengthy operation. Generating a 2048-bit 
key pair takes an average of 30 seconds on the security and management engine. Most of 
the generation time is spent on searching for prime numbers p and q.
The simple primality test described in step 2—although not a standard step in the 
key generation process—is a very useful trick to expedite the prime number search. On 
the security and management engine, this step improves the search time for a 1024-bit 
prime by as much as 65%. The following illustrates its pseudo code.
Algorithm X-Y: Preliminary Primality Test
Input: prime candidate
Output: if candidate may be a prime, updated candidate (if it may be a prime)
 
SmallestPrimes[NUM_OF_SMALL_PRIMES] = {/* hardcode smallest  




for i from 0 to NUM_OF_SMALL_PRIMES-1
  remainders[i] = candidate % SmallestPrimes[i]
 
Loop:
for i from 0 to NUM_OF_SMALL_PRIMES-1
  If ((Remainders[i] + delta) % SmallestPrimes[i] == 0)
    delta = delta + 2
      If delta < MAX_DELTA /* upper limit of delta before giving up this 
candidate */}
        goto Loop
      Else
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        return COMPOSITE
 




The logic under Loop is based on the following theorem:
Theorem: If x = k*p+r, then x%p = r%p.
Proof: x%p = (k*p+r)%p = ((k*p)%p + r%p)%p = (0 + r%p)%p = r%p.
Taking advantage of this simple theorem, instead of the large candidate x, the prime 
search uses the small sum r of the remainder and delta in the modulus operation. This 
trick significantly reduces computation time.
Note ■  to find a big prime number from a random number, always run the preliminary 
primality test (prime sieve) and adjust the random number, if possible, before running the 
Miller-rabin test.
The key pair generation is a blocking call. Because it takes several seconds to return, 
under certain circumstances, applications may prefer to abort the key generation before 
its completion. The kernel API provides an optional callback and abortion capability. The 
application may pass in a pointer to a callback function. The kernel, while performing the 
key pair generation, will periodically call back and see whether the application wants to 
stop the generation. The callback option is especially useful when a power event, such as 
a shutdown, happens in the middle of a key pair generation, in which case the application 
must not block the power event and must abort the generation as soon as possible.
Some applications running on the security and management engine need a RSA key 
pair during service enrollment or provisioning that is initiated by an end user. A key pair 
will be generated during the enrollment or provisioning operation, and the user has to 
wait for a key pair generation to complete. Obviously, having a customer waiting for  
30 seconds or longer is not a user-friendly design.
To improve the user’s experience, every time the kernel boots, it voluntarily 
generates a certain number of 2048-bit RSA key pairs and stores in a cache in memory. 
When an application invokes key generation, a pregenerated key pair is returned 
immediately, and then the kernel generates a new key pair in a low-priority thread to fill 
the cache.
Note ■  Consider pregenerating rsa key pairs to improve the user’s experience.
The kernel’s RSA key generation API is shown in Figure 3-7. The figure shows the 
scenario where the key generation runs to completion. Figure 3-8 shows the scenario 
where the generation is aborted.

































Figure 3-9. Kernel RSA key pair validation API
The key pair validation tests whether p and q are probable prime numbers and 
verifies the relationships among the key components passed in by the application  
(see Figure 3-9).
Encryption and Decryption
For encryption, first represent the plaintext as a big number m such that 0 <= m < n, and 
then calculate ciphertext c as
 
c := me mod n
 
c must be smaller than n. For decryption, first check whether c is smaller than n. If so, 
recover plaintext by calculating
 
m := cd mod n
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It is obvious that the encryption, usually performed by a client such as a smartphone 
that has limited computational resources, is much faster than decryption, because e is a 
small integer, whereas d is a big integer as long as k bits.
For kernel’s RSA decryption function, if the caller passes in private key elements d_P, 
d_Q, and q_inv, then the kernel will use a more efficient way to calculate m from c:
 
m1 := cd_p mod p
m2 := cd_q mod q
h := q_inv·(m1 – m2) mod p
m := m2 + h·q
 
Using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, all modulo operations are with modulus  
p or q, which is half the size of modulus n, hence resulting in better performance.
The “raw” RSA encryption without any padding is vulnerable to several known attacks. 
For example, if m is so small that me < n, then c = me mod n = me and m can be easily 
calculated by taking the eth root of c. For mitigation, m should be padded with a carefully 
designed scheme so that the padded plaintext does not fall into ranges that are exposed 
to attacks. Because the plaintext message has to be padded before encryption, it must be 
somewhat smaller than k bits. PKCS and OAEP are the two best-known padding schemes. 
The security and management engine’s kernel supports these two padding schemes.
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Figure 3-11. Kernel RSA decryption API
Digital Signature
The digital signature is realized using public key cryptography, where the signer (the only 
entity that is able to generate the signature) signs a message with its secret private key and 
the verifier (anyone) verifies the signer’s signature with the signer’s public key.
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As seen earlier, plaintext and ciphertext, when treated as integers, in RSA encryption/
decryption must be smaller than n in value. However, there should not be such a length 
restriction on the message to be signed. Therefore, the hash function is used to convert 
a long message to its small-size digest. What is being signed is the digest instead of the 
message itself. The two properties of the hash function—collision-free and one-way—make 
sure that the message cannot be forged, and signing the digest is as good as signing the 
message.
RSA
The k-bit RSA signature generation follows these steps:
 1. Calculate h = hash(m).
 2. Apply padding scheme to h and result in k-bit value, em.
 3. Calculate signature s = emd mod n or use the Chinese 
Remainder Theorem. This is a RSA raw decryption operation, 
though some literatures call it “private key encryption.”










Figure 3-12. Kernel RSA signature generation API
RSA signature verification follows the following steps:
 1. Calculate em' = se mod n. This is a RSA raw encryption 
operation, though some literatures call it “public key 
decryption.”
 2. Examine whether em' is formatted correctly according to the 
padding scheme. If the formatting of em' is wrong, then reject 
the signature.
 3. Extract the message digest portion h' from em' according to 
the padding scheme.
 4. If h'== hash(m), then accept the signature; otherwise, reject 
the signature.
The Kernel API for RSA signature verification is depicted in Figure 3-13.


















Figure 3-13. Kernel RSA signature verification API
The signing uses a private key, and the operation is slower. Signing is usually 
performed by a server with strong computational resources. The signature verification 
uses a public key and is usually performed by a client such as a mobile device.
The most popular signature-padding schemes are PKCS#1 and SSA-PSS. The kernel 
of the security and management engine supports both schemes.
ECDSA
The digital signature scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECDSA) is becoming 
more and more popular thanks to its high security strength and smaller key sizes 
compared to RSA. ECDSA is especially suitable for mobile embedded devices where the 
following are true:
Storage and memory space is limited•	
The entire key data may not be available at once•	
An elliptic curve has the following definition:
 
y2 = x3 + ax + b
 
where a and b are predefined constants. Conceptually, an elliptic curve looks like 
Figure 3-14.
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The ECDSA curves supported by the security and management engine are the 
curves defined for prime finite fields (“P curves”) in NIST’s DSS standard.16 Within a finite 
field, all coordinates are smaller than modulo p, where p is a large prime defined in the 
standard. The exact shape of the curve is determined by domain parameters, including 
a and b. A point on the curve is denoted as (x, y), where x and y are in [1, p-1] (that is, 
this is on a finite field). A special point called “base point” G, also a domain parameter, is 
defined for a given elliptic curve.
The point addition is a basic operation defined on elliptic curve. Figure 3-14 
demonstrates point addition of two points, P1 and P2. To calculate the sum of two points 
P1+P2, first connect them with a straight line and then extend the line to meet the elliptic 
curve at the third node. The opposite point to the x axis of the third node is the sum of P1 
and P2.
To add a point P to itself, draw a tangent line at the point and let the line meet the curve 
at the second node. Then the opposite to the x axis of the second node is the double of P.
Multiplication on an elliptic curve is realized by repeated additions. If a point P is 
added to itself k–1 times, then it becomes a scalar multiplication: an integer k multiplied 
by a point, denoted as Q = k * P. Notice that Q is also a point on the curve.
Note ■  for a big integer k, it is easy to calculate Q=k*P from k and P, but it is very  
difficult to derive k from Q and P.
Key Pair Generation and Validation
The mathematical foundation of ECC as an asymmetric key cryptography is the difficult 
problem of deriving k from Q and P in Q = k*P. The ECDSA key pair is defined by taking 
advantage of this important property. The private key PrivKey is a big number, between  
1 and n-1 inclusive.i The private key is generated randomly. The corresponding public key 
is a point PubKey on the curve such that
 
PubKey = PrivKey * G
 
Obviously, the key pair generation of ECDSA is much faster than that of RSA, as the 
private key is just a random big number. On the other hand, the private keys p and q of 
RSA must be prime numbers, which takes significantly more resources to obtain. On the 
security and management engine, generating a 256-bit ECDSA key pair takes about  
10 milliseconds, which is imperceptible from an end user’s perspective. The engine does 
not implement a key pair cache for ECDSA.
A major advantage of ECDSA over RSA signature is its smaller key size (hence 
smaller storage space required) with strong security protection. The security strength of 
in is the order of the elliptic curve. The order of a curve is a prime integer n such that n * G = O, 
where O represents the point at infinity.
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ECDSA is half of the size of the private key. So a 256-bit private key would provide 128-bit 
equivalent security as symmetric key cryptography. For comparison, the 2048-bit RSA 
provides only 112-bit of security.
This chapter does not describe the complete steps of ECDSA signature generation 
and verification. Instead, critical elliptic curve point operations used in ECDSA are 
explained, and optimization strategies for them are discussed in detail.
Scalar Multiplication
The scalar multiplication is the most intensive step in ECDSA signature generation and 
verification. The add-and-double algorithm is used to calculate k*P.
 1. Represent k in its binary form with digits 0 and 1.
 2. Start from result of “0” and scan the binary representation of k 
from left (most significant bit) to right (least significant bit).
For a bit that is 0, double the result. Move to the next bit.•	
For a bit that is 1, add point •	 P to the result and double the 
updated result. Move to the next bit.
 3. The resulting point after processing the rightmost bit is the 
final result.
Table 3-1 shows the computation of 198*P using the add-and-double algorithm. The 
first row in the table shows the binary representation of the scalar (198). The second row 
shows the result of the doubling operation from the row immediately to its left. The third 
row shows the result of the addition operation if the first row shows 1 in the column.
Table 3-1. Calculation of 198P Using Add-and-Double Algorithm
k=198 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
Double 0 2*P=2P 2*3P=6P 2*6P=12P 2*12P=24P 2*24P=48P 2*49P=98P 2*99P=198P
Add P P 2P+P=3P 6P 12P 24P 48P+P=49P 98P+P=99P
It is easy to see from the calculation that the scalar multiplication does not require 
the knowledge of the entire k before calculation can begin. Calculation can start as 
soon as some bits of k are available, and continues simultaneously while the rest of k is 
received. The portion of k that has been processed can be deleted from memory. The 
parallel processing can save substantial time for mobile devices. The RSA signature 
scheme does not have such flexibility.
Let the bit length of k be m and the number of 1s in the binary representation of k be w. 
The scalar multiplication of k*P requires m–1 point doublings and w-1 point additions. 
Note that doubling is in fact addition. On average w = 0.5*m, Therefore,
 
m + w -2 = 1.5*m -2
 
point additions are required for calculating k*P.
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Window Method
To reduce the number of point additions and speed up ECDSA arithmetic, one may apply 
a precomputation trick, namely, the “window method,” to the scalar multiplication. 
Instead of treating the binary representation of k as an m-bit string, the window method 
treats it as ceiling(m/t)ii “windows,” where each window is made up of t consecutive bits 
(i.e., the width of a window is t bits).
 1. Split the binary representation of k into windows of t bits.  
If m is not divisible by t, then pad (t-(m mod t)) zeros to the 
left of the most significant bit of k, before splitting the binary 
representation of k into windows.
 2. Precompute 2*P, 3*P, …, (2t-1)*P and store results in 
memory. The number of required precomputations is (2t-2).
 3. Start from result of “0” and scan binary representation of k 
from left to right.
For a window that is 0, calculate •	 (2t)*P' where P' is the 
result of previous column. Move to the next window.
For a window that has value of •	 v, calculate (2t)*(v*P + P'). 
Move to the next window.
 4. The resultant point after processing the rightmost column is 
the final result.
For example, the binary expression 11000110b of integer 198 can be split into four 




Here, window value 11b corresponds to 3P. Window value 10b corresponds to 2P. 
They must be precomputed before the scalar multiplication starts. Table 3-2 explains the 
calculation of 198P with windows size 2.
iiceiling(x) returns the smallest integer equal to or greater than the fraction x.
Table 3-2. Calculation of 198P Using Window Method with Window Size 2
k=198 11 00 01 10
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Table 3-3. Numbers of Addition Operations for m=256
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
A 0 2 6 14 30 62 126 254
B 127 95 74 59 49 41 33 31
C 255 254 253 252 251 250 249 248
A+B+C 382 351 333 325 330 353 411 533
Savings 0% 8.1% 12.8% 14.9% 13.6% 7.6% -7.6% -39.5%
For window size of t = 2, a quadrupling (multiplying by 4) is performed when moving 
to the next column. A quadrupling is equivalent to 2 point additions (first calculate  
2*P' = P'+P', then 4*P' = 2*P'+2*P'). In general, for window size of t bits, t additions 
are required when moving to the next column.
For window size of t = 2, there are 2t possible values of a window. For windows with 
a nonzero value, an addition operation is required. On average, (2t-1)/2t of all windows 
are nonzero.
To ramp up, using the window method to calculate k*P, there are three steps that 
need additions:
Precomputation•	
•	 A = 2t-2
Additions for processing a column•	
•	 B = ceiling((2t-1)/2t * ceiling(m/t)-1)
Additions when moving to the next column•	
•	 C = (ceiling(m/t)-1) * t
The total number of additions is A+B+C.
Table 3-3 compares total numbers of additions with different choices of t for m = 256 
(256-bit is one of the most commonly used ECDSA key sizes).
From the comparison, it is obvious that for m = 256, the optimal window size 
is 4 (emphasized in bold in the table). The number of precomputations increases 
exponentially with t. When the window is wider than 4 bits, the precomputation cost 
starts to outweigh the benefit of saving of additions during the scalar multiplication.
Dual Scalar Multiplication
Besides the “single” scalar multiplication Q = k*P, the ECDSA signature verification also 
uses a “dual” scalar multiplication:
 
Q = k1 * P1 + k2 * P2
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The dual scalar multiplication can be implemented by first performing two 
independent single scalar multiplications and then a point addition. However, this is not 
as fast as utilizing a smaller trick with a trivial precomputation cost of P1+P2.
Table 3-4 shows the computation of 197*P1 + 172*P2 using the precomputation 
trick.
Table 3-4. Calculation of 197*P1 + 172*P2 Using Precomputation Trick
k1=197 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
k2=172 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
Double 0 2P1+2P2 6P1+4P2 12P1+10P2 24P1+20P2 48P1+42P2 98P1+86P2 196P1+172P2
Add P1 3P1+2P2 197P1+172P2




For two scalars k1 and k2, there are four possibilities of their bit value combination, 
{0, 0}, {1, 0}, {0, 1}, and {1, 1}, corresponding to points 0, P1, P2, and P1+P2, respectively. 
P1 and P2 are already available; P1+P2 must be precomputed.
For a column that is {0, 0}, double the result. Move to the next bit.•	
For a column that is {1, 0}, add •	 P1 to the result and double the 
updated result. Move to the next bit.
For a column that is {0, 1}, add •	 P2 to the result and double the 
updated result. Move to the next bit.
For a column that is {1, 1}, add •	 P1+P2 to the result and double the 
updated result. Move to the next bit.
The resultant point after processing the rightmost column is the final result.
Let the bit length of k1 be m1 and that of k2 be m2; let the Hamming weight of k1 
be w1 and that of k2 be w2. Using the traditional add-and-double algorithm without 
precomputing P1+P2, calculating k1*P1+k2*P2 requires
 
(m1-1 + m2-1) + (w1-1 + w2-1) + 1 = m1 + m2 + w1 + w2-3
 
point additions. On average, w1 = 0.5*m1 and w2 = 0.5*m2. In the ECDSA signature 
verification, m1 = m2. Let m1 = m2 = m. The total number of additions becomes
 
m1 + m2 + 0.5*m1 + 0.5*m2 - 3 = 1.5 (m1 + m2) - 3
                              = 3*m - 3
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Using the method introduced in Table 3-4, one has to perform m-1 doublings and 
on average 0.75*m - 1 additionsiii during the scalar multiplication. Beforehand, one 
addition is needed for precomputing P1+P2. Treating doubling as addition, the total 
number of required additions is
 
(m - 1) + (0.75*m - 1) + 1 = 1.75*m - 1
 
When m is large, the trick saves approximately
 
(3 - 1.75) / 3 * 100% = 41.7%
 
of addition operations, with a tiny tradeoff of storing point P1+P2 in memory. Thus this is 
a very useful trick to speed up ECDSA on embedded systems.
The window method can also be applied to the dual scalar multiplication, in 
which case a window will have a height of 2 for k1 and k2. However, the amount of 
precomputations and memory consumption increases considerably with the increase of 
the window size.
Hardware Acceleration
To speed up RSA and ECDSA calls, the security and management engine has 





Exponentiation and modulo (using Montgomery multiplier)•	
Other Cryptography Functions
Besides the functions described earlier, the kernel supports a number of other 
algorithms:
ECDH (elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman) key agreement•	
AES-CMAC message authentication•	
RC4 stream cipher•	
DSA (digital signature algorithm)•	
iiiThe joint Hamming weight of k1 and k2 is defined as the number of nonzero columns of the binary 
representations of k1 and k2. A column is nonzero if at least one of the bits of k1 and k2 is nonzero 
for the column. There are four possible combinations of a column, {0, 0}, {0, 1}, {1, 0}, and {1, 1}, 
and they appear with the same probability, hence on average, 75% of all columns are nonzero 
columns and require addition.
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The design principle of the kernel is to support any cryptography algorithms that 
are required by at least one application. Depending on the data throughput expectation 
of the application and available gate areas in hardware, the requested cipher may be 
implemented either wholly in firmware or partially in hardware.
To save valuable resources in the embedded system, cryptography algorithms that 
are not used by any applications are not included in the system.
Secure Storage
In addition to cryptography, the kernel of the security and management engine supports 
other infrastructural functionalities that are needed by applications.
A partition of the SPI flash chip is reserved for storing the security and management 
engine’s nonvolatile data. As the flash size is very limited, the files cannot be too large. 
Generally speaking, the storage is intended for keys and credentials, such as device 
private keys, AMT passwords, and so on. It is not designed for storing bulk data such as 
video frames or network traffic.
The kernel’s storage manager lets applications choose what protections are required 
by individual files:
•	 Encryption: 128-bit or 256-bit AES, in CTR mode
•	 Integrity: HMAC-SHA-1 or HMAC-SHA-256
•	 Anti-replay: To mitigate a physical attack of replacing the file with 
a previous version of the file
•	 No protection: The file will be stored in plaintext without integrity 
or anti-replay protection
During boot, the kernel derives a 128-bit AES key and a 256-bit AES key used for 
file encryption and decryption. The kernel also derives an HMAC key used for HMAC-
SHA-1 and HMAC-SHA-256. These keys are referred to as storage keys. The storage keys 
are derived from security fuses that are random and unique for each instance of the part 
and burned into the security fuse block during manufacturing. Because the storage keys 
are different on every part, even if a file is copied from one part to another, it will fail the 
HMAC integrity check and will not be accepted by the firmware.
Although all files on the security and management engine use the same storage 
keys for protection, the storage manager in the kernel enforces access isolation so that a 
process is not able to access files that belong to other processes. The owning process of 
a file can also configure its file properties so the file can be shared with other specified 
processes with read and/or write privileges.
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Debugging
For engineering firmwareiv running on preproduction parts,v developers use debuggers 
that allow halting the processor, stepping through source code, and reviewing variable 
values and memory contents.
On production parts, however, the debug port is disabled by a fuse and only 
production-signed firmware images can execute. How to debug an application on 
production parts with signed firmware? The security and management engine offers 
two ways—debug messaging and special production-signed firmware—to facilitate 
debugging on production parts.
Debug Messaging
The kernel exposes a function that lets a calling application send messages through the 
engine’s LAN interface to a debug console. Applications can call this kernel function at 
interesting spots and milestones. This is similar to debugging using printf in software 
development. Applications must be careful not to send out sensitive information.  
A timestamp will be appended by the kernel for all messages.
Special Production-Signed Firmware Based on  
Unique Part ID
Production-signed firmware has the capability of overwriting the “debug port disabled” 
fuse and enabling debug port on production parts. Of course, generic released firmware 
that is production-signed must never open the debug port—otherwise, it would be a 
critical vulnerability.
To enable engineers to debug on production parts, Intel may sign special firmware 
with a production RSA key. The special firmware
Boots normally when running on the specific production part on •	
which the debugging will be performed.
Halts when running on all other production parts.•	
Enables the debug port.•	
Has a special version number such that attempt of updating from •	
a released firmware to this special firmware will fail. That is, the 
debug engineer must physically flash this special firmware to the 
flash chip on the specific part.
ivDebug-signed firmware is signed with a debug RSA key, not one of the production RSA keys.
vA preproduction part has the debug port enabled and allows debug-signed firmware to run.  
A production part has the debug port disabled by fuse and allows only production-signed 
firmware to run.
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The security fuses that are random and unique for each part are used to derive not 
only the storage keys but also a 128-bit value used as the unique part ID. Although the ID 
is unique, it does not pose privacy concerns because the part itself is the only entity that 
knows the value.
Obviously, the special firmware must hardcode the unique ID of the specific 
production part. During boot, the special firmware reads the unique ID from the part it 
is running on and compares with the hardcoded ID. If they match, it continues to boot 
and enables the debug port; otherwise, it is considered an attack. The firmware clears 
memory and halts the processor immediately.
But this method requires the knowledge of the unique ID of the part before the 
special firmware can be created. It means the released firmware must have an interface 
for outputting the unique ID to the host. Does this interface introduce privacy concerns? 
To avoid raising such concerns, the security and management engine invents a trick 
of randomization for the unique ID. With this trick, the value sent to the host is never 
the real unique ID, but a saltedvi randomization of it. The host receives a different 
randomized ID every time it retrieves the ID from the released firmware, even if it is the 
same hardware part.
Algorithm 3-1 explains the procedure of generating a salted part ID. The algorithm is 
implemented on released firmware.
Algorithm 3-1. Salted Part ID Generation on Released Firmware
Input: unique ID uid (128 bits)
Output: salted ID sid (128 bits)
 
random_string = get_random(32 bits);
hash = SHA-256(uid || random_string);
sid = leftmost 96 bits of hash || random string;
 
The logic in the special production-signed firmware for checking the salted ID is 
detailed in Algorithm 3-2.
Algorithm 3-2. Checking Part ID on Special Production-Signed Firmware
Input: unique ID uid (128 bits), salted ID sid (128 bits)
Output: matched or mismatched
 
random_string = right most 32 bits of sid;
hash = SHA-256(uid || random_string);
if (left most 96 bits of hash == left most 96 bits of sid)
  return matched;
else
  return mismatched;
 
viA salt is random data that is used as an additional input to a hash function.
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In both algorithms, SHA-256 can be replaced by another one-way function such 
as HMAC, in which case uid can be used as a message and random_string can be used 
as the HMAC key. The algorithms are meant to demonstrate the idea, and the sizes of 
variables can be changed depending on platform.
After the debug engineer retrieves the salted part ID from his production part, he 
notifies the build engineer of the salted ID. The build engineer then hardcodes the salted 
ID, creates the special firmware, and signs it with a production RSA key. The signed 
firmware image is sent to the debug engineer, who then flashes to his part and launches 
the debugger, just like on a preproduction part.
It is worth noting that, by the security policy, a production part contains top secrets 
that even debug engineers are not supposed to access—for example, an EPID (Enhanced 
Privacy Identification, see Chapter 5 of this book for details) private key. The special 
firmware erases all such secrets from memory before enabling the debug port. Debugging 
critical features such as EPID must be done with test keys and not real production keys.
Once debugging is completed, the part used for debug should be destroyed. The 
special production-signed firmware should be destroyed also.
Secure Timer
There is a protected real-time clock in the engine. Applications can use the clock through 
two kernel APIs:
•	 Start timer: An application calls this function to initialize/reset 
its timer. A new timer is created and it immediately starts to run. 
A handle will be returned to the caller for identifying the timer in 
the future.
•	 Get current timer value: An application calls this function with a 
timer handle to retrieve the current value of the specific timer. 
The current value shows the number of seconds that have elapsed 
since the start timer function was called.
Notice that the secure timer in the kernel shows time that has elapsed, but does not 
provide current date/time information. This is because the kernel has no secure way of 
receiving the date/time from a time server outside of the embedded system.
Applications are responsible for getting current UTC (Universal Time Coordinated) 
time from a trusted external time source. For example, EPID clients use X.509 certificates 
for authentication and key establishment. The EPID manager firmware must validate the 
client’s certificate before serving the client. To make sure the certificate has not expired, 
the firmware must always know the current date/time.
To get the current date/time information, the EPID manager requests a real-time 
OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) response from a trusted OCSP server, which 
was endorsed by Intel. The response contains the current date/time. The EPID manager 
saves the date/time (baseline) in a file in the kernel’s secure storage and calls the kernel’s 
Start timer function that starts the timer. Later, when the EPID manager is verifying the 
validity period of a certificate, it calls the Get current timer value function and calculates 
the current date/time by adding the kernel’s returned value to the baseline. The EPID 
manager requests a new real-time OCSP response every 30 days to calibrate its timer.
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Host-Embedded Communication Interface
Almost all applications on the security and management engine need to communicate 
with software programs running on the host. The link between the host and the engine is 
called a host-embedded communication interface, or HECI.
There is a HECI driver that runs in ring 0 of the host operating system and manages 
the HECI device on the PCI bus. Individual software programs must call the HECI driver 
to send messages to and receive responses from the embedded engine. On the embedded 
side, the kernel implements a HECI driver that is the counterpart of the HECI driver 
on the host. It manages HECI connections for all embedded applications. The host 
application and its corresponding embedded application must agree on the same unique 
HECI client ID beforehand. The client IDs are hardcoded in both software and firmware. 
The host application and the embedded application must also agree on structures of 
predefined messages so that the sender and the recipient can understand each other. 
Incorrectly formatted messages should be rejected gracefully and should not cause 
crashes.
The HECI interface per se is not secured. No encryption is performed on messages 
in transit by the HECI drivers. If required, the applications must apply appropriate 
protection, such as an encryption and integrity check, to the messages before 
transmitting them.
Due to bandwidth considerations, the HECI channel is designed to carry short and 
simple data, rather than bulk data such as network traffic or video and audio frames. The 
maximum size of a HECI message is configurable per product, depending on the worst-case 
usage model, and ranges between 1KB and 12KB. Firmware applications usually use 
HECI to receive control commands from the host and to send back status information 
to the host. For example, an EPID client sends a HECI message to the EPID manager 
firmware to establish a secure session; the firmware then responds with its ephemeral 
Diffie-Hellman public key.
Figure 3-15 shows the HECI message data flow among software applications, the 
host HECI driver, the embedded HECI driver, and embedded applications.
















Figure 3-15. HECI architecture overview
Reception of messages is signaled through system interrupts. The embedded HECI 
driver is a dispatcher that delivers messages received from the host to the right recipient 
applications. The separation among different HECI clients is realized by the task isolation 
mechanism described in Chapter 4.
Direct Memory Access to Host Memory
The security and management engine is equipped with direct memory access (DMA) 
devices that allow firmware to access (read and/or write) the host’s memory space by 
referencing its physical addresses. The kernel exposes an API for select applications to 
perform DMA operations between memory of the host and the embedded system.
Applications may use DMA to exchange large amounts of runtime data with the host. 
For example, AMT network traffic, video and audio frames, and so on. Such data is too 
large and too slow to transmit over the HECI interface.
Although DMA is certainly a convenient way to transmit data between the host and 
the embedded system, it grants the embedded engine with arguably dangerous privileges 
and creates security concerns. Vulnerability in the engine, if found by hackers, may be 
exploited to attack the host’s memory.
At the Black Hat conference in 2009, Alexander Tereshkin and Rafal Wojtczuk 
demonstrated an attack that exploited a flaw of the management engine.17 The attack 
manages to read and write arbitrary host memory, with certain exceptions, through the 
embedded DMA engine from a root kit. See Chapter 4 for more descriptions of the attack.
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Although the design flaw exploited by the attack is not in the DMA component, the 
DMA engine is a key factor that makes the attack possible. To minimize the abuse of 
DMA, the firmware architecture should apply tighter control and exercise the security 
design principle of least privilege. Today, the security and management engine enforces 
stringent restrictions for applications accessing the host memory:
The kernel’s DMA API is only open to applications that •	
have justifiable need to access host memory. The white list 
of applications that are permitted to DMA with the host is 
hardcoded in firmware and cannot be changed at runtime.
For those allowed applications, the kernel enforces minimum •	
privileges (read only from host, write only to host, or read and 
write). That is, an application that only needs read access is 
forbidden from writing to host memory.
A small and isolated component in the kernel is responsible •	
for determining whether DMA access requested by the calling 
application is legitimate, and if so, the range of host memory 
addresses to be accessed by the application. During development 
and validation, very thorough and comprehensive review and 
testing is performed on this component in the attempt to make it 
a bug-free component.
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